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“Financial  Innovation  and  Risk  Management,  ” the  title  of  the  conference  session 
at  which  this  paper  is  being  presented,  suggests  two  separate,  yet  interconnected  issues: 
financial  innovation  and  the  management  of  financial  risk.  Financial  risk  has  always 
been  an  element  of  financial  systems  regardless  of  the  pace  of  financial  innovation.  In 
fact,  a principal  function  of  financial  intermediaries  has  always  been  to  manage  and  even 
bear  financial  risks  such  as  credit  risk,  interest-rate  risk,  foreign  exchange  risk,  legal 
risk,  operational  risk,  fraud,  and  so  forth. 
Innovation,  which  often  is  sparked  by  new  technology,  creates  two  risks  that  are 
distinct  from  the  risks  cited  above.  First,  financial  innovation  can  accentuate  the  risks 
that  are  always  present  in  financial  systems  because  the  technology  that  unleashes 
innovation  permits  financial  transactions  to  be  executed  faster,  less  expensively,  over 
greater  distances,  and  in  more  complex  forms.  Recent  advances  in  electronic  technology 
(computers  and  telecommunications),  for  example,  have  merely  unleashed  a  much  more 
sophisticated  undertaking  of  traditional  financial  risks. 
Second,  innovation  heightens  regulatory  risk,  which  is  the  risk  that  government 
financial  regulation  will  become  inadequate  or  even  counterproductive.  Regulation  in 
fact  is  a business  that  unfortunately  becomes  riskier  when  government  becomes  the 
regulator.  This  increased  riskiness  develops  because  government,  or  in  effect  the 
political  marketplace,  is  dominated  by  the  status  quo,  as  evidenced  by  entrenched  interest 
groups,  such  as insurance  agents,  who  constantly  struggle  in  the  political  marketplace  to 
preserve  as  much  of  the  status  quo  as  they  can.  Innovation,  of  course,  is  the  enemy  of 
the  status  quo.  Hence,  innovation  creates  a tension  between  the  way  the  status  quo  wants 
the  world  to  continue  to  be  and  the  way  the  world  eventually  must  become;  a rapid  rate 
of  innovation  greatly  magnifies  that  tension.  This  heightened  tension  in  the  regulatory 
arena  creates  regulatory  risk;  that  is,  the  increased  likelihood  of  regulatory  error.  This 
paper  will  argue  that  electronic  technology  has  heightened  regulatory  risk  within  the 
financial  system,  thereby  worsening  regulatory  moral  hazard  and  fostering  regulatory 
arbitrage  in  a manner  that  can  quickly  destabilize  a financial  system. 
All  is  not  lost,  however,  for  the  cross-guarantee  concept  for  privatizing  banking 
regulation  and  its  attendant  deposit  insurance  risk  represents  a market-driven  regulatory 
innovation  that  can  match  the  pace  of  the  technological  innovation  currently  sweeping  the 
financial  services  world.  This  concept  can  do  so because  it  relies  upon  the  commercial marketplace  rather  than  the  political  marketplace  to  control  financial  risk-taking. 
Electronic  technology  is  rapidly  liberating  financial  markets  from  the  political 
marketplace.  In  effect,  the  cross-guarantee  concept,  which  is  summarized  below,  will 
eliminate  the  regulatory  moral  hazard  that  electronic  technology  has  greatly  exacerbated 
in  recent  years.  The  paper  concludes  by  outlining  the  many  benefits  cross-guarantees 
will  bring  to  the  financial  system  as well  as  the  structural  and  international  implications 
of  using  cross-guarantees  to  bring  market-driven  regulation  to  the  financial  services 
sector  of  the  American  economy. 
THE IMPACT  OF ELECTRONIC  TECHNOLOGY  ON FINANCIAL  SERVICES 
Electronic  technology  is  revolutionizing  the  production  and  delivery  of  financial 
services,  in  large  part  because  electronic  technology  permits  the  efficient  transformation 
of  legal  contracts,  the  common  denominator  of  all  financial  services,  from  paper  to 
electronic  bits  and  bytes.  The  conversion  of  a financial  services  contract,  be  it  a check, 
charge  slip,  loan,  insurance  policy,  stock,  bond,  or  whatever,  to  electronic  form 
dramatically  alters  the  financial  services  business  in  two  very  significant  ways. 
First,  the  electronification  of  financial  services  dramatically  alters  the  economics 
of  producing  and  delivering  financial  services.  Specifically,  the  financial  services 
industry  has  shifted  steadily  in  recent  decades  from  a business  characterized  by  relatively 
low  fixed  investment  and  relatively  high  but  stable  variable  unit  costs  into  a business 
with  a  substantial  initial  investment  in  hardware  and  software  but  low  and  declining 
variable  unit  costs.  Changes  in  the  economics  of  any  industry  force  alterations  in  the 
structure  of  that  industry  --  new  types  of  firms  come  into  existence,  existing  firms  either 
adapt  and  grow  or  shrivel  and  even  disappear.  The  same  types  of  structural  changes  are 
taking  place  in  financial  services  even  though  these  changes  have  been  frustrated  by 
over-regulation  and  relatively  successful  efforts  by  the  status  quo  to  preserve  the 
long-standing  regulatory  compartmentalization  of  the  financial  services  industry. 
Second,  the  transformation  of  legal  contracts  to  an  electronic  form  has  permitted 
the  unbundling  and  repackaging  of  these  contracts  in  a manner  undreamed  of  ten  or 
twenty  years  ago.  Sometimes,  this  unbundling  and  repackaging  is  driven  by  real 
economics;  in  other  words,  this  activity  actually  reduces  the  amount  of  real  resources 
(people,  computers,  paper,  legal  services,  etc.)  that  is  consumed  in  producing  or 
delivering  a particular  financial  service.  Oftentimes,  though,  this  activity  becomes  a 
regulatory  arbitrage  in  that  real  economic  resources  are  expended  to  evade  or  sidestep 
arbitrary  regulatory  costs,  such  as  uniform  capital  standards  that  penalize  low-risk 
lending.  Figure  1 suggests  that  many  new  financial  services  activities,  notably  asset 
securitization,  are  regulatory  arbitrages  and  not  innovations  sparked  by  sound  economics. 
2 REGULATORY  MORAL  HAZARD  IN BANKING 
Moral  hazard  in  banking  is  usually  associated  with  deposit  insurance. 
Supposedly,  moral  hazard  exists  when  insured  depositors  exercise  insufficient  vigilance 
in  monitoring  the  financial  condition  of  their  bank  or  thrift  or,  alternatively,  the 
managers  of  an  insured  institution  operate  it  in  a reckless  manner  because  it  can  easily 
obtain  insured  deposits  from  the  public.  However,  in  any  banking  system  in  which 
individual  banks  are  highly  regulated  by  a government  agency,  the  moral  hazard  lies  with 
the  government  regulator,  whether  or  not  individual  institutions  have  deposit  insurance. 
Government  banking  regulators,  even  in  the  absence  of  deposit  insurance,  are 
charged  with  ensuring  the  safe-and-sound  operation  of  individual  banks  and  thrifts.  To 
that  end,  government  establishes  by  statute  and  regulation  what  it  believes  constitutes 
safe-and-sound  bank  operating  practices,  such  as  minimum  capital  requirements,  limits 
on  loans  to  one  borrower,  and  so  forth.  Government  examiners  are  then  given  the  right 
to  examine  individual  institutions  at  any  time  to  ensure  that  these  institutions  are 
conforming  with  the  appropriate  statutes  and  regulations.  To  ensure  this  conformity, 
examiners  have  access  to  extensive  non-public  data  about  banks  and  thrifts,  data  that  are 
denied  to  these  institutions’  stockholders,  depositors,  other  creditors,  and  rating  agencies. 
In  other  words,  government  bank  examiners  are  uniquely  positioned  to  know  more  about 
a bank’s  financial  condition  than  any  other  outside  party.  Government  banking 
supervisors,  acting  on  the  basis  of  information  government  bank  examiners  uncover,  are 
uniquely  empowered  to  take  enforcement  actions  against  banks  and  thrifts  that  have 
violated  banking  regulations.  If  an  institution  has  become  insolvent,  or  is  approaching 
insolvency  under  current  Prompt  Corrective  Action  rules,  then  the  government  banking 
supervisors  are  empowered  to  take  the  institution  over  and  to  place  it  in  a 
government-administered  receivership.  Hence,  bank  and  thrift  failures  are  regulatory 
failures  that  occur  because  regulators  do  not  act  quickly  or  aggressively  enough  to  close 
a failing  institution  before  it  becomes  insolvent. 
Regulatory  moral  hazard  became  painfully  evident  when  Congress  and  the  public 
began  to  look  increasingly  to  uninsured  depositors  and  other  creditors  of  insured  banks 
and  thrifts  to  signal,  by  running  from  a troubled  institution,  that  the  regulators  had  failed 
to  catch  its  problems  in  a timely  manner.  In  fact,  the  entire  notion  of  depositor 
discipline  for  highly  regulated  banks  and  thrifts  is  premised  on  the  belief  that  private 
sector  parties  equipped  only  with  sketchy  and  untimely  information  should  sound  the 
alarm  when  government  regulators  have  fallen  asleep  on  the job.  Not  surprisingly,  this 
reliance  on  uninsured  depositors  and  other  creditors  as  a back-up  source  of  banking 
discipline  fosters  regulatory  moral  hazard  because  this  reliance  effectively  tolerates 
regulatory  ineptitude.  If  government  regulation  worked  properly,  there  would  be  no 
need  for  depositor  discipline. 
3 Instead  of  looking  to  uninsured  depositors  to  blow  the  whistle  on  inattentive  or 
incompetent  regulators,  the  political  process  should  be  much  more  demanding  of  those 
who  have  been  given  unique  access  to  extensive  non-public  information  about  the 
condition  of  individual  banks  and  thrifts.  In  particular,  those  who  have  been  given  this 
regulatory  opportunity,  and  have  assumed  the  corresponding  regulatory  responsibility, 
should  pay  for  their  own  regulatory  failings  rather  than  attempting  to  pass  insolvency 
losses  to  healthier  banks,  in  the  form  of  excessively  high  deposit  insurance  premiums, 
and  to  uninsured  depositors  and  other  creditors,  in  the  form  of  outright  losses.  In  effect, 
if  government  wants  to  be  in  the  bank  regulatory  business,  it  should  provide  a warranty, 
in  the  form  of  complete  loss  protection,  to  those  whom  banking  regulation  supposedly 
protects. 
ELECTRONIC  TECHNOLOGY  IS DESTROYING 
THEOLDREGULATORYORDER 
The  regulatory  scheme  described  in  the  preceding  section  constitutes  the  old 
regulatory  order.  Essentially,  governments  try  to  prevent  the  failure  of  individual  banks 
and  thrifts  through  regulatory  micromanagement.  Governments  have  also  relied  upon 
comparable  regulatory  micromanagement  schemes  to  prevent  the  failure  of  insurance 
companies,  broker/dealers  of  securities,  trust  companies,  and  other  fiduciaries.  The 
electronic  technology  described  above,  however,  is  destroying  the  old  regulatory  order 
because  this  technology  is  making  it  easier  and  cheaper  for  financial  entrepreneurs  to 
sidestep  the  regulatory  micromanagement  that  has  been  imposed  on  the  older  types  of 
financial  services  firms,  specifically  banks  and  insurance  companies.  As  Figure  2 
shows,  depository  institutions  in  particular  (band  1 in  Figure  2) have  lost  substantial 
market  share  in  recent  decades,  in  terms  of  assets  held  on-balance-sheet,  to  newer  and 
less  regulated  forms  of  financial  intermediation,  such  as  money  market  mutual  funds,  the 
commercial  paper  market,  asset  securitization,  pension  funds,  and  mutual  funds.  Much 
of  this  shift  in  market  share  is  the  result  of  regulatory  arbitrage.  In  effect,  the  financial 
markets  are  taking  away  business  from  government  regulators. 
Many  contend  that  the  emergence  of  new  forms  of  financial  intermediation  has 
made  the  financial  markets  more  efficient.  However,  as Figure  3 suggests,  the  relative 
productivity  of  the  financial  services  sector  of  the  economy  has  declined  since  the  end  of 
World  War  II.  Today,  it  takes  almost  twice  the  percentage  of  the  work  force  to  finance 
and  insure  the  economy’s  output  and  assets  as  it  did  in  1947.  Consequently,  the 
percentage  of  the  GDP  originating  in  banking,  finance,  and  insurance  has  more  than 
doubled  since  the  end  of  the  war.  In  effect,  the  financial  overhead  of  running  the 
American  economy  has  increased  relative  to  its  total  output.  That  is  hardly  a  sign  of 
greater  efficiency. Worse,  the  shift  of  financial  intermediation  away  from  the  highly  regulated  to  the 
less  regulated,  due  to  regulatory  arbitrage,  has  increased  the  potential  instability  of  the 
American  financial  system.  Recent  congressional  efforts  to  squeeze  risk  out  of  federally 
insured  banks  and  thrifts,  notably  through  the  FDIC  Improvement  Act  of  1991,  have 
merely  shifted  that  risk  elsewhere  in  the  financial  system.  Contrary  to  the  hopes  of 
many,  financial  intermediation  risks  squeezed  out  of  banks  and  thrifts  do  not  simply 
disappear  into  the  ether,  for  as  every  child  learns,  when  you  squeeze  an  inflated  balloon, 
it  merely  bulges  elsewhere;  where  it  bulges  is  where  it  will  burst.  Not  surprisingly, 
then,  numerous  financial  disturbances  over  the  last  fourteen  months  have  occurred 
outside  the  American  banking  system. 
As  the  right  side  of  Figure  4 illustrates,  the  Federal  Reserve  is  the  lender  of  last 
resort  to  the  entire  financial  system.  In  a  serious  financial  disturbance,  when  substantial 
declines  in  asset  values  occur,  the  Fed,  in  an  effort  to  maintain  financial  stability  and  to 
preserve  asset  values,  may  not  recover  all  of  the  money  that  it  lends  to  illiquid  and 
possibly  insolvent  financial  intermediaries.  However,  Congress  has  not  established  a 
mechanism  for  charging  successful  non-banking  firms,  in  a manner  comparable  to  federal 
deposit  insurance  (left  side  of  Figure  4),  for  any  losses  the  Fed  might  incur  in  lending  to 
an  insolvent  non-banking  firm,  such  as  a money  market  mutual  fund.  Instead,  as  the 
right  side  of  Figure  4 illustrates,  taxpayers  will  suffer  that  loss.  In  effect,  regulatory 
arbitraging’s  shift  of  financial  risk  away  from  federally  insured  banks  and  thrifts  has 
actually  increased  the  taxpayer  risk  posed  by  the  American  financial  system. 
If  Congress  attempts  to  reduce  the  potential  for  systemic  risk  outside  of  the 
banking  system  through  new  forms  of  regulatory  micromanagement,  such  as  the 
regulation  of  derivatives,  financial  entrepreneurs  will  use  the  ever  increasing  power  of 
electronic  technology  to  devise  new  forms  of  regulatory  arbitrage.  Most  likely,  an 
extension  of  regulatory  micromanagement  to  the  currently  less  regulated  types  of 
financial  intermediaries  will  trigger  a shift  of  more  and  more  financial  risk-taking  to 
locales  outside  the  United  States.  These  locales  lie  beyond  Congressional  reach,  yet 
offshore  systemic  disturbances  could  easily  ricochet  back  into  the  United  States.  The 
Barings  collapse  in  February  almost  provided  a real  live  example  where  problems  in  one 
financial  center  can  have  worldwide  repercussions. 
CROSS-GU ARANTEES:  A NEW REGULATORY  TECHNOLOGY 
The  time  has  come  to  recognize  that  the  banking  system  needs  a  new  form  of 
banking  regulation  that  can  readily  cope  with  the  changes  wrought  by  electronic 
technology.  This  new  regulatory  technology  must  meet  several  criteria: 
5 l It  must  be  able  to  respond  quickly  to  the  changes  in  the  economics  and 
structure  of  financial  services  that  are  being  driven  by  electronic  technology. 
l It  must  eliminate  regulatory  moral  hazard. 
l It  must  minimize  regulatory  arbitrage. 
l It  must  eliminate  taxpayer  risk  caused  by  banking  failures  and  systemic 
instability. 
l It  must  produce  a more  efficient  banking  system. 
The  cross-guarantee  concept  for  privatizing  banking  regulation  and  its  attendant 
deposit  insurance  risk  easily  meets  all  of  these  criteria.  This  concept  has  been 
transformed  into  a 213-page  bill,  H.R.  5227,  that  would  enact  cross-guarantees  into  law. 
Rep.  Tom  Petri  (R-WI),  who  introduced  this  bill  in  October  1994,  will  introduce  a 
nearly  identical  version  of  it  in  mid-1995. 
Briefly,  the  Petri  bill  will  create  a cross-guarantee  marketplace  where  banks  and 
thrifts  individually  will  seek  a  “cross-guarantee”  contract  that  will  protect  &  of  the 
institution’s  deposits,  non-deposit  funding,  counterparty  risks,  and  balances  owed  to 
clearing  houses  and  payments  systems.  A  bank  or  thrift  will  enter  into  this  contract  with 
a voluntarv  syndicate  of  direct  guarantors  (largely  other  banks  and  thrifts)  who  will  be 
assembled,  much  like  a  stock  or  bond  underwriting  syndicate,  to  assume  the  risks 
imposed  by  the  contract.  In  effect,  the  cross-guarantee  contract  will  unbundle  the 
liability  side  of  a bank  or  thrift’s  balance  sheet.  This  unbundling  will  shift  to  the 
institution’s  direct  guarantors  the  “residual  insolvency  risk”  that  is  now  borne  by  the 
creditors  who  will  become  guaranteed  under  the  institution’s  cross-guarantee  contract. 
Residual  insolvency  risk  is  the  risk  that  losses  in  the  bank  or  thrift,  should  it  fail,  will 
exceed  its  stockholders’  equity,  thus  causing  losses  to  its  creditors.  Hence,  the 
guaranteed  institution’s  on-balance-sheet  equity  capital  will  serve  as  an  insurance 
deductible  for  cross-guarantee  purposes.  The  right  side  of  Figure  5 illustrates  how  this 
risk-shifting  will  occur. 
In  a  sense,  then,  the  cross-guarantee  concept  is  comparable  to  asset 
securitization,  except  that  cross-guarantees  represent  liability  securitization;  that  is,  the 
cross-guarantee  contract  will  fully  secure  or  protect  against  loss  all  of  the  guaranteed 
institution’s  funding  and  most  of  its  other  liabilities. 
Since  the  risk  of  loss  to  direct  guarantors  will  be  fairly  low  under  most  economic 
conditions,  they  will  not  have  to  separately  capitalize  their  cross-guarantee  risk 
exposures.  Instead,  they  will  treat  their  cross-guarantee  risk  exposures  as  a contingent 
6 liability,  or  in  effect  as  a contingent  claim  on  their  own  equity  capital.  In  fact,  one  of 
the  many  strengths  of  the  cross-guarantee  system  is  that  it  does  not  require  that  the 
cross-guarantee  risk  be  borne  by  separately  capitalized  entities  comparable  to  the  FDIC’s 
Bank  Insurance  Fund  (BIF)  or  Savings  Association  Insurance  Fund  (SAIF).  As  Congress 
learned  to  its  sorrow  in  the  S&L  crisis,  separately  capitalized  insurance  funds  inevitably 
lack  the  financial  resources  to  deal  with  a crisis.  Figure  6 contrasts  the  enormous 
loss-absorbing  capacity  of  the  cross-guarantee  system  with  the  limited  ability  of  a 
separately  capitalized  insurer  to  absorb  a catastrophic  loss.  Also,  the  absence  of  a 
separate  fund  means  that  direct  guarantors  will  be  writing  checks  to  pay  for  their  losses 
as  guarantors  as  those  losses  are  being  incurred,  which  will  keep  direct  guarantors 
focused  on  the  risks  they  have  assumed  as  guarantors. 
There  is,  of  course,  no  free  lunch,  particularly  when  it  comes  to  markets,  such 
as  the  cross-guarantee  market  that  the  Petri  bill  will  create.  Direct  guarantors  will  be 
enticed  to  be  guarantors  by  the  opportunity  to  earn,  in  expectation  of  a profit,  a 
risk-sensitive  premium  that  effectively  will  be  negotiated  between  the  guaranteed 
institution  and  its  syndicate  of  direct  guarantors.  Negotiated  premiums  for  cross- 
guarantee  contracts  will  introduce  market-driven  pricing  into  the  deposit  insurance 
business,  something  that  will  never  be  possible  as  long  as  deposit  insurance  is  a 
government  monopoly.  The  low  level  of  guarantor  losses  will  hold  premium  rates  to just 
a few  basis  points  per  dollar  of  protected  liabilities,  even  for  the  smallest  banks. 
In  addition,  the  contract  will  specify  the  safe-and-sound  operating  practices  to 
which  the  guaranteed  institution  will  agree  to  adhere  to  during  the  term  of  its  contract, 
which  the  Petri  bill  limits  to  a maximum  length  of  five  years.  Hence,  banks  and  thrifts 
will  be  able  to  negotiate  safe  operating  practices  that  will  reflect  the  business  strategy 
they  have  elected.  The  ability  of  banks  and  thrifts  to  negotiate  these  standards  will 
effectively  eliminate  regulatory  arbitrage  while  permitting  these  institutions  to  adapt 
much  more  quickly  than  is  possible  today  to  the  ongoing  impact  of  electronic  technology 
on  the  economics  and  therefore  the  structure  of  financial  services.  The  operational 
improvements  that  can  be  achieved  through  negotiated  safety-and-soundness  standards 
incorporated  in  cross-guarantee  contracts  will  greatly  enhance  the  efficiency  of  banks  and 
thrifts.  Also,  the  superb  credit  enhancement  that  cross-guarantees  will  provide  to 
guaranteed  banks  and  thrifts  will  enable  these  institutions  to  profitably  fund  even  the 
lowest  risk  credits  available  in  the  marketplace,  which  in  turn  will  enable  banks  and 
thrifts  to  recapture  much  of  the  asset  market  share  they  have  lost  to  the  financial 
system’s  regulatory  arbitragers. 
Because  safety  and  soundness  concerns  will  become  the  sole  province  of 
cross-guarantee  contracts,  the  Petri  bill  exempts  guaranteed  banks  and  thrifts  from  &l 
federal  safety-and-soundness  statutes  and  regulations,  including  the  Base1 risk-based 
capital  requirements.  While  “one-size-must-fit-all”  government  regulation  creates  the 
7 herd  effect  so  often  seen  in  banking,  negotiated  cross-guarantee  contracts  will  largely,  if 
not  completely,  eliminate  this  herd  effect  because  guaranteed  banks  and  thrifts  will  seek 
to  differentiate  themselves  from  their  competitors,  not  mimic  them,  which  is  what 
government  regulatory  micromanagement  promotes. 
So  that  direct  guarantors  can  monitor  the  compliance  of  a guaranteed  institution 
with  its  cross-guarantee  contract,  the  Petri  bill  authorizes  private-sector  firms,  called 
syndicate  agents,  to  perform  this  monitoring  task  or  in  effect  to  act  as  a delegated 
monitor  on  behalf  of  the  institution’s  direct  guarantors.  Syndicate  agent  firms,  which  do 
not  exist  today,  will  combine  elements  of  investment  banking,  public  accounting,  and 
insurance  brokerage.  Each  cross-guarantee  contract  will  designate  one  firm  to  serve  as 
the  syndicate  agent  under  that  contract.  This  firm,  in  turn,  will  have  ongoing,  direct 
access  to  non-public  information  about  the  guaranteed  institution.  Svndicate  agents  will 
comnletelv  renlace  all  government  bank  and  thrift  examination  and  sunervision  activities. 
In  effect,  the  cross-guarantee  concept  completely  rejects  the  notion  of  depositor  discipline 
as  a backstop  to  government  regulation  and  instead  imposes  the  entire  disciplining  burden 
on  direct  guarantors  and  their  syndicate  agents.  Figure  7 illustrates  the  parties  to  a 
cross-guarantee  contract. 
Replacing  government  regulators  with  syndicate  agents  will  eliminate  the 
regulatory  moral  hazard  discussed  above  since  a  syndicate  agent  will  quickly  go  out  of 
business  if  its  poor  performance  causes  losses  for  the  direct  guarantors  under  the 
contracts  for  which  that  firm  had  served  as  the  syndicate  agent.  Unfortunately, 
government  regulators  are  not  faced  with  job  or  financial  losses  or  a loss  of  professional 
reputation  if  they  fail  to  prevent  bank  and  thrift  failures.  In  fact,  FIRREA,  the  S&L 
cleanup  legislation  Congress  enacted  in  1989,  effectively  gave  bank  and  thrift  regulators 
huge  raises  in  the  aftermath  of  an  enormous  regulatory  failure. 
The  Petri  cross-guarantee  bill  may  appear  to  represent  a  massive  deregulation  of 
America’s  banks  and  thrifts,  but  it  is  not.  Instead,  the  bill  shifts  the  regulation  of 
individual  banks  and  thrifts  from  the  political  marketplace  to  the  much  stronger,  more 
efficient,  and  more  responsible  commercial  marketplace.  The  Petri  bill  actually  bars  the 
federal  government  from  attempting  to  prevent  the  failure  of  individual  banks  and  thrifts 
since  that  will  be  the  job  of  the  cross-guarantee  marketplace.  However,  the  Petri  bill 
does  contain  numerous  interconnected  risk-dispersion  rules  and  other  safeguards  designed 
solely  to  ensure,  far  more  effectively  than  government  regulatory  micromanagement  ever 
can,  that  depositors  and  taxpayers  will  not  suffer  any  losses  from  failed  banks  and  thrifts, 
even  in  conditions  worse  than  the  Great  Depression.  Bank  and  thrift  insolvency  losses 
will  be  totally  absorbed  within  the  cross-guarantee  system.  In  fact,  the  private-sector 
“solvency  safety  net”  the  cross-guarantee  legislation  will  construct  under  the  entire 
banking  system  will  be  far  stronger  financially  than  our  increasingly  indebted  federal 
government.  The  system’s  safeguards  will  be  enforced  by  a  small  new  agency  called  the 
8 Cross-Guarantee  Regulation  Corporation  (CGRC).  However,  the  CGRC  will  have  no 
regulatory  authority  over  guaranteed  banks  and  thrifts  beyond  that  which  it  will  need  to 
enforce  the  Petri  bill’s  systemic  safeguards.  Likewise,  the  CGRC  will  not  be  able  to 
examine  guaranteed  institutions.  That  responsibility  will  lie  entirely  with  the  agent  for 
those  directly  at  risk  if  a guaranteed  institution  fails,  the  institution’s  guarantors. 
The  strength  of  the  cross-guarantee  system,  coupled  with  its  unconditional 
guarantee  of  almost  all  bank  and  thrift  liabilities,  will  effectively  eliminate  runs  on  banks 
and  thrifts,  and  the  systemic  instability  that  runs  can  cause.  Consequently,  the  Federal 
Reserve  will  no  longer  have  to  serve  as  a lender  of  last  resort  to  the  banking  system. 
Figure  8 contrasts  the  philosophy  of  the  present  government  regulatory  scheme  (left  side 
of  the  figure)  with  the  cross-guarantee  concept  (right  side  of  the  figure). 
THE MANY  BENEFITS  CROSS-GUARANTEES  WILL  DELIVER 
Cross-guarantees  will  deliver  many  benefits  to  the  financial  system  and  to  the 
American  economy.  These  benefits  include  the  following: 
l The  banking  system  will  operate  much  more  efficiently  and  safely,  and  with 
essentially  no  risk  to  taxpayers. 
l By  protecting  all  deposits,  the  cross-guarantee  system  will  end  the  too-big-to- 
fail  discrimination  against  banks  “too-small-to-save”  that  exists  under  the 
present  system  of  federal  deposit  insurance. 
l The  forward-looking,  risk-sensitive  pricing  of  cross-guarantee  contracts  will 
foster  much  more  accurate  interest  pricing  for  loans  and  securities,  which  in 
turn  will  curtail  the  growth  of  speculative  bubbles  whose  subsequent  bursting 
causes  much  economic  pain  and  accounts  for  most  bank  insolvency  losses. 
l The  improved  loan  and  securities  interest  pricing  that  will  occur  in  a world  of 
cross-guarantees  will  lessen  the  perceived  need  for  monetary  policy,  which 
more  often  than  not  hurts  rather  than  enhances  the  performance  of  the 
American  economy. 
l Due  to  the  strength  of  the  cross-guarantee  system’s  solvency  safety  net, 
Congress  will  feel  much  more  comfortable  than  it  is  today  to  grant  additional 
powers  to  banks,  thrifts,  and  their  subsidiaries.  Banks  and  thrifts  in  turn  will 
gain  the  structural  flexibility  they  increasingly  need  to  adapt  to  changing 
technology  and  marketplace  conditions. l Guaranteed  banks  and  thrifts,  utilizing  the  much  greater  operational  freedom 
they  will  enjoy,  will  be  able  to  much  more  effectively  and  efficiently  serve 
low  and  moderate-income  communities  than  can  be  achieved  under  the 
compulsion  of  the  Community  Reinvestment  Act. 
l With  just  minor  changes  in  the  Petri  bill,  the  cross-guarantee  system  can  be 
extended  to  apply  to  any  type  of  financial  intermediary,  thus  enhancing  the 
efficiency  and  safety  of  the  entire  financial  system.  This  extension  of 
cross-guarantees  will  further  reduce  regulatory  arbitrage  within  the  financial 
system. 
l Because  the  cross-guarantee  concept  will  work  in  any  market  economy  in 
which  there  is  sufficiently  reliable  contract  enforcement,  competitive  pressures 
will  force  other  industrialized  nations  to  enact  comparable  cross-guarantee 
legislation  once  the  Petri  bill  is  enacted.  The  spread  of  cross-guarantees 
throughout  the  industrialized  world  will  improve  the  economic  performance  of 
these  nations  and  indirectly  help  the  economies  of  the  lesser  developed  nations 
that  currently  lack  the  legal  systems  that  a cross-guarantee  system  needs  in 
order  to  flourish. 
CONCLUSION 
Banking  regulation  ultimately  is  about  power,  specifically  power  over  the  money 
flowing  through  the  banking  system.  In  a slowly  changing  and  highly  compartmentalized 
financial  world,  the  political  marketplace  was  able  to  capture  and  maintain  substantial 
power  over  the  financial  marketplace,  which  until  recently  was  dominated  by  depository 
institutions,  specifically  banks  and  thrifts.  However,  electronic  technology  is  rapidly 
destroying  the  ability  of  the  political  marketplace  to  maintain  its  control  over  the 
financial  marketplace.  Power  over  finance  is  irreversibly  shifting  to  the  much  more 
efficient  and  democratic  commercial  marketplace.  However,  this  shift  is  increasing 
regulatory  risk  within  the  financial  system,  specifically  the  regulatory  moral  hazard  that 
has  always  accompanied  government  regulatory  micromanagement  of  individual 
depository  institutions. 
The  cross-guarantee  concept  not  only  provides  a  sound  escape  from  the 
imbroglio  of  government  banking  regulation,  but  it  will  deliver  benefits  far  beyond  the 
banking  system.  Cross-guarantees  will  bring  pain  to  some,  specifically  to  those  who 
profit  from  the  inefficiency  and  instability  fostered  by  government  banking  regulation. 
But  the  American  electorate  should  willingly  treat  that  pain  as  a  small  price  to  pay  for 
transforming  American  banking  into  a  system  properly  geared  for  the  next  millennium. 
10 Figure  1 
Which  ReDresents  More  Efficient  Funds  Intermediation? 
m  An  asset-backed  commercial  paper  program:  structure  and  cash  flows 
Transfer  of  interests  in  pools  d  /  Payment  of  principal  and 
receivables  and  initial  credit  enhancement  i  interest  on  receivables 
Additiond  credit  C*itd 
investment 
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interest  on  commercial  paper 
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pwer notes 
Structure ____ 
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Source:  Federd  Reserve  Bulletin,  February  1992,  pge  111. 
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1946  1949  1952  1955  1958  1961  1964  1967  1970  1973  1976  1979  1982  1985  1988  1991 
1.  Depository  Inst.  3.  GSEs,  Mortgage  Pools  8,  Asset-Backed  Securities  5.  Broker/Dlrs,  Fin.  Cos,  Other  ins.  & Mortgage  Cos.  7.  Retirement  & Pension  Funds 
2.  Money Market  Funds  4.  Cpen Market  Paper  (primarilly  Commercial  Paper) 6.  Mutual  Funds,  Closed-End  Funds,  RElTs  &  8.  Life  Insurance  Companies 
Bank  Personal  Trusts  (data  since  1969) 
Sources:  Post-l  951  data  obtained  from  the  Federal  Resew’s  Flow  of  Funds Accounts  (unadjusted  levels)  dated  6/14/94.  Data  for  prior  years  obtained  from  earlier 
Flow  of  Funds Reports. 





















































































































































































































































































































































 Present  Structure  of  the  Federal  Safety  Net 
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U.S.  Treasury 
/ 
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General  taxpayer  money used  o& 
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/’ 
if  banking  industry  unable  to  cover 
/’ 
all  BIF  losses. 
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A’ 
Direct  taxpayer  liability  for  all 
losses  the  Fed  incurs  in  lending 
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Firms  (2) 
Insurers 
Gov’t  Non- 
Sponsored  Financial 
Enterprises  Firms 
BIF-insured  banks 
-  Direct  liability  for  any  insolvency  loss 
(flow  of  money to  cover  losses). 
_____. 
III-II 
Any  uninsured  institution  with  explicit  or 
implicit  access  to  the  Fed  discount  window 
Fed  as  a  fully  collateralized  lender  of  last  resort  avoids  any  loss 
because  FDIC bears  all  insolvency  losses  in  these  institutions. 
(1)  The Emergency Liquidation  provision  of  FDlClA  (Section  473)  made direct  access  to  the  Fed  discount  window by  nondepository  instiiutiins 
more explicit. 
(2)  Customer  balances  in  broker/dealer  subsidiaries  of  securities  firrns  are  protected  against  the  insolvency  of  the  broker/dealer  by  the 
Securities  Investor  Protection  Corporation,  up  to  specified  limits. 
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The  Cross-Guarantee  System  Shifts  All 
Creditors’  Insolvency  Risk  in  a  Bank  or  Thrift  to 
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